Contrary to the nonsense in the corporate press of a “unified opposition,” the non-Chavista elements have been anything but unified. Had they been, they may have made the most of the 48% of the electorate that did not support Maduro according to the count by the CNE.

The assertion by Machado/González that they had won the 2024 election by a margin of 70% lacks credibility. That seven out of 10 Venezuelans supported them was not proven in the streets. Machado called her followers out on Aug. 3 and again on Aug. 17, but the turnout was smaller than even her pre-election rallies.

Meanwhile, pro-Maduro rallies dwarfed the opposition’s. This was an indication of the high level of organization and popular support for the Bolivarian Revolution.

Still, in retrospect, the U.S. could have tried to galvanize support for an alternative project. There were politically moderate state governors and legislators who might have unified the fractious opposition. Instead, the U.S., anticipating a Maduro victory, obstinately clung to the disqualified Machado with her surrogate González.

The Machado/González platform was not a popular one, calling for extreme neoliberal privatization of education, health care, housing, food assistance, and the national oil agency. A far more attractive and winning platform would have been to retain the social benefits of Chavismo with the promise of relief from U.S. unilateral coercive measures.

In backing someone as unattractive, unknown, and unpopular as González, the U.S. showed its disinterest in a good faith engagement in the democratic electoral process.