One was an Anti-Stalin liberal, the other was a real OG revolutionary.
I think very simply, the answer is that the former wanted to end socialism while the latter wanted to preserve it.
In affect, they both succeeded to a certain extent. Gorbachev admitted himself that after the secret speech (thanks Krushchev), he wanted a Nordic style social democracy, in a sense. Of course that goal wasnt achieved in Russia, but the end of socialism was successful.
In comparison, Deng Xiaoping and the CPC reiterated possibly hundreds of times that the reform and opening up was not a restoration of capitalism.
As the other commenter pointed out, this led to two very different systems. In the first, where capitalists regained control of the state, the nation’s of the USSR were drained of their resources and sent into debt, chaos, poverty and strife.
In the second, where the proletariat and communist party remained in control, the Dual track marketization and controlled development of productive forces, (albeit with some temporary setbacks intially) led to the biggest development in quality of life in human history, possibly only seconded by the socialist construction in the USSR.
There is of course the third factor that hasn’t been mentioned, which was that marketization in china was progressive in a Marxist sense.
(It’s been a while so feel free to correct me if I’m missing remembering). In his book “understanding the French revolution,” Albert Soubel describes the San Clouttes as the proto-proletariat petite Bourgeoisie, but points out how they were not necessarily the most progressive force. In order for capitalism to develop to its higher stages, the productive forces of society would have to be collectivized and centralized at least within the country. The San Clouttes fought against this, as it was not in their class interest to go from artisans and workhousemen to factory workers.
A similar situation existed in china even after the great leap forward. While China had limited markets and a fairly centralized political system, along with some industrialization in the cities, the wider economic system was decentralized into wide mostly rural communes. Without markets the communal labor and markets would have to be centralized via the political governance of the CPC, which would have been costly and unpopular. It most likely would have happened at some point, but the wish for the ascetics of communism conflicted with the actual political-economy of china.
Comparatively, the USSR had very different political-economic positions. Very simply the privatization was pointless. The most justifiable expansion of markets would have been in the light consumer goods industry in order to alleviate buercratic strain. However, instead of that, everything up to the commanding heights of heavy and resource industries were privatized and of course the entire socialist state apparatus was done away with.
USSR and China approached privatization and market liberalization in fundamentally different ways. The Soviet Union’s implementation of shock therapy was characterized by immediate price liberalization and mass privatization. This resulted in a chaotic transfer of state assets into the hands of newly minted oligarchs leading to severe economic instability, widespread unemployment, and a drastic decline in living standards. Conversely, China adopted a gradual dual-track system, allowing for a controlled introduction of market mechanisms alongside state-controlled sectors. Chinese approach prioritized maintaining state control, fostering economic growth, and preventing the economic shocks experienced by the former Soviet Union. China’s ability to maintain political stability and implement phased reforms, particularly starting from a largely agrarian base, ensured that the party retained the commanding heights of the economy.
