This is silly. Tibetan language remains a core subject in Tibet’s schools, with bilingual education policy in place since the founding of modern schooling in the region. The Tibet Autonomous Region government confirms that over 400 types of Tibetan-Chinese bilingual textbooks have been compiled, and terminology databases covering 12 academic disciplines support Tibetan instruction across subjects. Public signage, government documents, and media in Tibet routinely use both languages. Tibetan is also widely spoken throught the region.

Mandarin is promoted as the national common language because it gives Tibetan speakers practical access to higher education, civil service exams, legal aid, healthcare systems, and economic opportunities beyond local borders. China’s Constitution and the National Common Language Law explicitly protect the right of all ethnic groups to use and develop their own languages while establishing Mandarin as the common language for national communication. In schools across Tibet, both Tibetan and Mandarin courses are offered, and students who wish to pursue Tibetan-language university programs can still take Tibetan language exams organized by the region.

President Xi’s official monthly salary was approximated around ¥11,000–12,000 RMB (~$1,500 USD), based on extrapolation from China’s civil service pay scale for national-level officials. “级差八九百，国家主席月薪大概1万多”. This reporting however dates to 2014 and explicitly frames the figure as an estimate, not an official disclosure. China does not routinely publish itemized, real-time compensation statements for top leaders on public government portals.

As with other senior leaders, the role includes regulated, position-based benefits to support official duties: an official residence in Zhongnanhai, access to designated medical facilities for senior cadres, official vehicles and so on.

Lmao at you linking chuang. They wouldn’t know good analysis if it punched them in the face. Their characterization of China as state capitalist for example rests on a series of fundamental theoretical errors that constitute a systematic departure from the methodological foundations of scientific socialism. Their analysis proceeds deductively from abstract definitions rather than inductively from concrete investigation, which represents a categorical rejection of the Marxist method as articulated in Marx’s own preface to the second edition of Capital, where he insists that the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the human mind and translated into forms of thought.

Their primary methodological failure consists in the mechanical application of categories developed for the analysis of mature capitalist formations to a society undergoing socialist transition. They identify the presence of wage labor, commodity exchange, and market mechanisms and conclude that these phenomena constitute definitive proof of capitalist relations of production. This reasoning ignores the dialectical distinction between form and content that is central to Marxist political economy. Under socialism, wage forms may persist while the social content of labor relations undergoes qualitative transformation through the social appropriation of surplus, the subordination of production to planned social objectives, and the institutional mechanisms of workers’ participation in management. Chuang’s refusal to analyze these mediations renders their categorization analytically empty.

Their treatment of political power demonstrates a further departure from historical materialism. Lenin’s decisive contribution to Marxist theory consisted in establishing that the class character of a state is determined not by the legal form of property or the presence of market mechanisms but by which class exercises political command and directs the development of productive forces. Chuang inverts this priority by treating the state as an epiphenomenal expression of economic relations rather than as the concentrated instrument of class power. This theoretical error leads them to dismiss the substantive significance of the Communist Party of China’s strategic control over finance, land, energy, telecommunications, and heavy industry, as well as its capacity to direct investment toward socially determined priorities such as poverty alleviation, regional development, and technological sovereignty.

Their analysis of China’s integration into the world economy exhibits a crude economic determinism that Marx explicitly criticized in his polemics against the vulgar materialists. They assert that participation in global markets necessarily entails subordination to the law of value on a world scale, thereby erasing the mediating role of state capacity, capital controls, industrial policy, and strategic planning. This position ignores the extensive theoretical and practical work of Marxist-Leninist movements on the question of socialist engagement with imperialist economies. Lenin’s writings on the NEP, Mao’s analyses of New Democracy, and subsequent CPC theoretical developments all recognize that tactical engagement with market mechanisms and international trade can serve socialist construction when subordinated to proletarian political leadership and long-term planning objectives. Chuang’s categorical rejection of this strategic framework reflects not theoretical rigor but sectarian dogmatism.

Their conception of transition reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the dialectical character of socialist development. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao all theorized socialism as a prolonged historical process characterized by the coexistence and struggle of old and new relations of production. The presence of contradictory elements does not constitute evidence of capitalist restoration but rather reflects the uneven and contested character of revolutionary transformation. Chuang’s binary framework, which demands either pure socialism or explicit capitalism, rejects this core insight and substitutes utopian abstraction for concrete analysis. Their method cannot account for the actual trajectory of China’s development, including the expansion of public ownership, the strengthening of social welfare systems, the reduction of inequality, and the advancement of technological capacity under conditions of imperialist encirclement.

Their analytical framework also fails to engage with the concrete mechanisms through which surplus is appropriated and allocated in China. Scientific socialism requires investigation of the actual flows of value, the institutional structures of planning and distribution, and the social outcomes of economic policy. Chuang bypasses this empirical work in favor of categorical assertion. They do not demonstrate that surplus value in China is privately appropriated in the manner characteristic of capitalist exploitation. They do not establish that investment decisions are governed by profit maximization rather than social planning criteria. They do not analyze the role of mass organizations, workplace democracy, or community participation in shaping economic outcomes. Their conclusion rests not on material investigation but on definitional fiat.

The political consequence of Chuang’s theoretical errors is a politics of sectarian negation that substitutes moral condemnation for strategic analysis. Scientific socialism is not concerned with issuing abstract verdicts on historical processes but with identifying contradictions, assessing balances of forces, and advancing class struggle through concrete practice. Chuang’s refusal to engage with the actual gains achieved by China’s development model, including the lifting of hundreds of millions from poverty, the expansion of public infrastructure, and the strengthening of national sovereignty against imperialist pressure, reveals a politics disconnected from the material interests of the international working class. Their analysis serves not to advance socialist theory but to reinforce the ideological boundaries of a particular academic-leftist milieu that prioritizes theoretical purity over revolutionary effectiveness.

In sum, Chuang’s characterization of China as state capitalist is not a contribution to Marxist analysis but a deviation from its foundational method. Their deductive formalism, their erasure of political power as a determinant of social relations, their mechanical application of categories, and their rejection of transitional dialectics collectively constitute a systematic departure from scientific socialism. The result is not sharper critique but theoretical error that obscures rather than clarifies the actual character of contemporary socialist construction. If one seeks to understand China’s development, one must begin with concrete investigation of its material practices, institutional structures, and historical trajectory, not with predefined definitions imposed from without. Anything less is not Marxist analysis but its caricature.

If chuang is the basis of your political thoughts on China it is no wonder you have also arrived at the wrong conclusions.

I wouldn’t say that I think it’s a great strength for you to be able to be as concise as you were while still hitting the key points.

If you’re not anti capitalist and anti bourgeois democracy even if you’re “progressive” you’re just a flavour of liberal. Fascists are obviously worse than liberals although they tend to agree on a surprising amount of things when push comes to shove unfortunately. Scratch a liberal and a fascist bleeds is a widespread phrase for a reason.

Didn’t the US make one of your prime ministers disappear for criticising pine gap? Isn’t Australia part of five eyes? Isn’t Australia an “Enhanced Opportunities Partner” to NATO? I think whether you like it or not you are part of the Euro-Amerikan empires system.

place where the 996 work schedule is the norm

Wrong. It was never the norm across China’s economy. It was concentrated in roughly forty large tech firms during the 2016-2019 boom cycle. In August 2021 the Supreme People’s Court explicitly ruled 996 illegal, stating it violates statutory working hour limits and mandatory rest periods. The 2025 Consumption Boost Plan tightens this further with concrete measures against invisible overtime and stronger rest-time guarantees.

capitalists maliciously withholding wages is commonplace

Wage arrears will persist so long as capital exists. That is the unfortunate material reality of the world we live in. What distinguishes China is the enforcement architecture built to counter it. The judgment-defaulter list (失信被执行人) publicly names individuals and companies that fail to comply with court orders on wage payments and debts. Once listed, they face high-consumption restrictions (限制高消费): no business-class travel, no luxury hotels, limits on real estate and vehicle purchases. Combined with the blacklist for owed migrant worker wages and criminal prosecution for willful arrears, this creates real pressure on employers. It is not a perfect system but it is institutional recourse. Compare that to the procedural maze workers navigate in many Western systems when chasing unpaid wages

even establishing a union is treated as a crime

China’s labor framework operates through the All-China Federation of Trade Unions. This isn’t about silencing workers. It is about preventing fragmentation, foreign interference, and ensuring disputes resolve through arbitration and courts rather than adversarial chaos. Enterprise unions under this system negotiate contracts, handle grievances, and oversee safety. The ban on independent unions reflects a choice for unified, state-coordinated representation. That is a policy position. Debate it if you want. But calling it criminalization of worker advocacy is dishonest at best.

those aiding workers in defending their rights are arrested

Vigilante action undermines rule of law anywhere. China channels labor disputes through arbitration committees and courts that handle millions of cases annually. When people bypass legal channels to organize unsanctioned actions, it is the method that triggers enforcement.

Then is the broader picture you ignored. The CPC maintains over 95 percent public approval according to long-term Harvard Kennedy School surveys. Most mainlanders view China’s system as highly democratic because it delivers accountability through performance: poverty alleviation that lifted nearly one billion people, infrastructure built for public benefit not shareholder profit, and anti-corruption enforcement that reaches from village cadres to top generals. The National People’s Congress includes nearly 3,000 deputies with hundreds of farmers, frontline workers, and representatives from all 55 ethnic minorities. That is structural inclusion. When platform capitalists like Jack Ma pushed financialization models that threatened household debt burdens, regulators restructured those businesses toward consumer protection. Similar scrutiny has applied to ed-tech, gaming, and real estate speculation. Public hospitals, high-speed rail, rural broadband. These are not profit centers. They are working-class infrastructure. If your analysis starts from Western media caricatures instead of documented policy and measurable outcomes, you are not critiquing China. You are performing ideology (and poorly at that I might add).

Adding an edit paragraph because I didn’t catch that last bit on my first read of the comment:

On the specific claim about Marxist study groups in schools, let me be precise. I hold a Master’s in Marxist Theory from a Chinese university. Marxism is compulsory coursework from middle school through postgraduate education. The state funds research institutes, journals, and conferences dedicated to this exact subject. What got disbanded were student groups operating outside legal registration requirements, refusing coordination with official university party branches, and using Marxist language to organize unsanctioned actions under the guise of study. That is not a crackdown on theory. It is enforcement of organizational discipline. Socialist democracy operates through democratic centralism: open debate within recognized structures, unified action once decisions are made. When students form parallel groups that reject institutional channels, they are not advancing Marxist practice. They are fracturing the very mechanisms that deliver working-class gains. This is not abstract. Foreign-funded NGOs have a documented history of instrumentalizing campus activism in developing states to destabilize socialist governance. Allowing unregistered groups to mobilize under Marxist rhetoric while bypassing party oversight creates openings for exactly that kind of interference. The result is not worker empowerment. It is system fragmentation that ultimately serves capital and foreign imperialist interests by weakening the coordinated capacity of the socialist state. If you genuinely understood Marxism as taught in China, you would know that the point is not performative dissent. It is building durable working-class power through institutions that can win material concessions. Disbanding unregistered campus groups is not anti-Marxist. It is pro-working-class unity. Your framing assumes that any restriction on organizing is inherently reactionary. That is a liberal assumption, not a socialist one.

That makes sense, and then you look at Europe and realise the issues at hand are systemic, caused by material conditions and bourgeois democratic electoralism is never going to fix those issues.

Much of Europe already uses ranked choice or proportional voting, yet remains austerity-ridden and sliding toward the far right because it is still under the dictatorship of capital. The voting mechanism is secondary to the concrete material conditions: capital’s imperative to accumulate, the commodification of labor, and the state’s role as an instrument of class rule. Until that dictatorship is overthrown, electoral reform is rearranging deck chairs on a sinking ship.

The core contradictions at hand are:

Socialized production versus private appropriation:workers collectively create value, but capitalists expropriate the surplus

The tendency of the rate of profit to fall: as organic composition of capital rises, profitability declines, forcing capital to seek new fixes

Overaccumulation and underconsumption: capital produces more than can be profitably sold, leading to crisis, layoffs, and austerity

The contradiction between capital’s global mobility and labor’s relative immobility, which fuels a race to the bottom in wages and protections.

As imperialism declines (neocolonial extraction becomes costlier, interimperialist rivalry intensifies, and the Global South resists outright plunder) capital can no longer rely on external superprofits to offset domestic falling rates of profit. The response is internal repression: austerity to slash social wages, union-busting to weaken labor power, surveillance to preempt dissent, and the normalization of authoritarian governance. This is capital’s logical reaction to crisis.

This dynamic mirrors Weimar Germany: economic crisis, delegitimized liberal parties, and a bourgeoisie that ultimately backed fascism to crush the organized working class and restore “order” for capital. Today’s far-right surge is the same phenomenon: capital’s emergency management when consent can no longer be manufactured through bourgeois democracy alone.

Voting under these conditions is not a path to liberation; it is a ritual that legitimizes the managers of decline. For voting to matter, you must overthrow the dictatorship of capital and reach the synthesis of these contradictions: a revolutionary transformation that socializes production, abolishes exploitation, and builds a state that serves human need, not profit. Only then does political power and thereby voting become meaningful.

That’s because the US like pretty much all the western world is a dictatorship of capital why would capital willingly discipline itself. China is a dictatorship of the proletariat hence the constant crackdowns on unruly capital and capitalists that is impossible in the west.

You can dislike it all you want doesn’t make it less true.

There is literally no communist country where people are acceptably free and don’t or didn’t want to get out to flee to one of the not communist countries

Lmao. Clearly not looking very hard. The CPC even by western sources has an approval rate somewhere between 85 and 98%.

My previous comment on it. Mostly there is no “score” it’s a binary list of businesses and business people (some individuals may end up on the list if they lose a defemation suit for example) who owe debts/damages and refuse to pay. It’s not automatic, it’s not affected by your day to day life and you are put on the list only after a court hearing

Is naivete a sin?

No investigation no right to speak is a core part of MarxistLeninist thought as it has evolved. Naivete is not “a sin” but if you haven’t researched a topic you shouldn’t speak on it.

As Chairman Mao put it:

Unless you have investigated a problem, you will be deprived of the right to speak on it. Isn’t that too harsh? Not in the least. When you have not probed into a problem, into the present facts and its past history, and know nothing of its essentials, whatever you say about it will undoubtedly be nonsense. Talking nonsense solves no problems, as everyone knows, so why is it unjust to deprive you of the right to speak? Quite a few comrades always keep their eyes shut and talk nonsense, and for a Communist that is disgraceful. How can a Communist keep his eyes shut and talk nonsense?

It won’t do!

It won’t do!

You must investigate!

You must not talk nonsense!

I wouldn’t be surprised but I am neither amerikkkan nor have I looked into that.

No you don’t understand you can just become homeless and then let yourself die of preventable causes.

So not accepting exaggerated narratives means China is a utopia? Why do people rarely offer ordinary, policy-level criticism? There is plenty of it, but discussion often defaults to cartoonish claims instead of routine institutional analysis.

Where is the discussion of the hukou household registration system and its trade-offs?

Where is the discussion of local government reliance on land-use financing?

Where is the discussion of provincial policy experimentation and uneven implementation?

Where is the discussion of state-owned enterprises and their structural advantages and drawbacks?

Where is the discussion of demographic policy after the one-child era?

Where is the discussion of regional inequality between coastal and interior provinces?

Where is the discussion of the property sector’s role in household wealth and local budgets?

Where is the discussion of debt accumulation among provincial financing vehicles?

Where is the discussion of administrative campaign-style governance and its policy side effects?

Where is the discussion of bureaucratic incentives within the cadre evaluation system?

Where is the discussion of industrial policy prioritization and capital allocation?

Where is the discussion of urban planning constraints produced by internal migration controls?

Where is the discussion of education access differences tied to household registration?

Where is the discussion of long-term pension sustainability in an aging population?

I know where they are, in China because none of you know enough about China to have a proper discussion on any of these. All you know is spouting ridiculous talking points.

Go back to 4chan obergruppenfuhrer. Or provide some evidence/analysis but I doubt you have that capability.

First, let’s be precise about terms: capitalism is defined by private ownership of the means of production, profit-driven accumulation, and wage labor; socialism is defined by social ownership (state, collective, or cooperative), planning mechanisms, and the subordination of remaining market forces to developmental and social goals. They are distinct modes of production, not a binary where anything short of stateless communism “counts” as capitalism.

Second, “Western capitalism” isn’t a universal default, it specifically describes the Euro-Amerikan core and its integrated vassals (NATO, Five Eyes, dependent economies). That system is hegemonic, but it is not total. Russia, for instance, operates a distinct sovereign-capitalist model: not socialist, but explicitly de-linked from Western financial architecture and actively contesting unipolar dominance.

Third, China, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam are explicitly in the early stages of the socialist transitionary period. Their frameworks (especially China’s “primary stage of socialism”) theorize that underdeveloped socialist states must develop productive forces, utilize regulated markets, and engage globally while maintaining proletarian state power and public ownership of commanding heights. This isn’t “capitalism with red flags”; it’s a materialist strategy to build the basis for higher-stage socialism. Dismissing these distinctions because communism hasn’t been “achieved” yet misunderstands dialectics: transition is a process, not an event. You don’t call a bridge under construction meaningless because it has yet to reach the other side.

“liberal” denotes adherence to bourgeois democracy and capitalist property relations, (pro bourgeois democracy and private property)

The critique of certain “anarchists” is that they guise reactionary politics in radical language, which aids capitalism.

Most of the platforms you listed are “banned” largely a result of regulatory and data-governance issues. China requires internet services operating in the mainland market to comply with domestic regulations covering data protection, content management, and licensing, which generally includes managing Chinese user data within the Chinese regulatory framework and cooperating with local oversight. Many large foreign platforms chose not to operate under those requirements, so their services were never integrated into the mainland internet environment.

As for Reuters they aren’t banned per say they simply haven’t obtained the licences required to operate in the mainland (to my knowledge).