geikei [none/use name]

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Joined 4 years ago
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Cake day: December 23rd, 2020

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  • The inflection point where the US will no longer be able to content and keep up with China militarily in the only theater that matters (South East Asia, First Island Chain, Taiwan) is somewhere between now and 2030. The inflection point where China is energy and tech independant enough and its global import/export network is balanced and diversified enough towards countries that would not follow the US in any attempt at economic war against them is again a pre 2040 thing. Thats their course but to keep it that way making correct and steady decisions on their domestic economic, industrial and political restructuring is way more dangerous and a focus than taking more active stances regarding the middle east or Ukraine with a lot less room for mistakes


  • How are they being encircled? The US alied stooges in the erea are the same as always, Japan, SK, Taiwan and Philippines. In regards to those US alliances and military presence the situation is the same as it was 10 years ago. They cant do much bar making any SK or Japanese action against china in some future conflict economy collapsing for them and in that aspect they are much more able today than years ago

    No other neighbouring nation will side with the US against China, economically or militarily. Not indonesia,not vietnam, not Thailand,not Singapore,not laos,not Malaysia, not the Stans, bot Mongolia ,not even China. With every day that passes their economies and development are even more dependent and intermingled with China’s and for the Muslim majority nations US public option has drop like a rock in the last year so US lost them for the near future.

    And to the most important point, China has military superiority against the US and allies in any conflict taking place in SCS and off of the Chinese shores. They outgun and arguably outtech the US in that region and every day that passes the military balance of power regionaly shifts more and more to Chinas favor. The actual trends are the opposite of them getting encircled


  • As a seperate point to the bellow, since this is something you constantly say it must happen, how do you ever expect the Yuan to take a substancial share of the dollar’s position worldwide without any QE happening and without some financial carrots thrown to foreign finance capital. Its impossible. Any dedollarization wordwide has to come with an increased yuan share even if it never becomes more than a moderate minority % wise. Every single measure taken would have to be taken sometime for that to happen.

    But either way not everything has to be about the dollar.

    What the central govt just did is that they spent a year letting the financial system languish in an all downside environment, making the financial sector so desperate for any kind of dependable asset to invest in that investors started begging for sovereign bonds at any yield, which then effectively lowered the cost of issuing more sovereign debt, and reset market wide ROI expectations from the lofty days of real estate exuberance, ultimately making it cheaper to start the transition from a land finance based financial system to sovereign bonds finance. The central govt had the option of intervening much earlier to preserve a higher anchoring point for long term financial value extraction, and instead they chose to wait for the credit cycle to bottom until it was clearly starting to impact economic momentum before intervening with fresh credit injections. They saw 3 straight months of deceleration and decided to do some easing. Decisions on intervention have followed quarterly trends for years now. They will a continue drip irrigation approach until they feel there is sufficient headway on debt deleveraging.

    And some other notes

    The fiscal element is smaller than the chinese pandemic stimulus and much, much smaller than the '08 chinese stimulus. If we factor incremental credit, the size difference is even larger.

    Capital formation is what drives credit formation in China. GCF as a % of GDP rose in the 2000s, plateaued over the last decade and is presently transitioning to its decline phase. The aim of loosening credit is to stabilize capital intensity i.e. prevent it from declining too quickly. Beijing is very focused on the downward slope of the transition. Also Higher-income groups drive the majority of demand (consumption and gross capital formation) in China in the last decade. So even tho CPC focus is on decreasing inequality and uplifcting lower income groups (GINI has droped like a rock in the last decade after all) into a healthy consuming middle class they still have to make sure the economic activity of higher income groups doesnt drop too much and too fast before the lower income groups ,well stop being that, and are able and willing to support domestic consumption on their backs. But RE downturn and stock market being garbage has made lot of the top 10% in China lose and decrease their treats a bit too fast for CPCs liking so throwing some stock numberinos and helping measures is meant to stabilize that decline into something managable , not to reverse the trend or the economic restructuring. So for example the mortgage interest cuts impacted ~50 million households that have mortgages, totaling approximately ~150 million people, or ~9-10% of the total population. These households are predominantly in the top two quintiles but acounted for an outsided piece of the total consumption and GCF like i said and like i said their economic activity was dropping a bit too fast for China’s liking

    So when economic indicators weakened in the summer, much of it driven by worsening sentiment — especially in higher-income groups. Beijing’s worry was on trickle-down effects from higher-income groups to the broader economy. For example, Fixed Asset Investment growth in the larger, higher-income provinces was faltering. It was down ~3% in Guangdong YTD. That is important for lower-income migrant workers in the largely blue-collar construction and manufacturing industries. On the consumer side, declining/stagnant asset prices clearly contribute to such worsening sentiment and decreased spending in those higher-income groups. It was enough of a real economy impact that Beijing finally felt the exercise a “call option” and try to put a “floor” on asset prices, both in its property & stock markets.


  • If nothing else it will be more interested to see where the money goes. What if anything grows from this monetary stimulus will tell China a lot about which financial channels are functioning and the current structure of economic activities. Finance in China has been reigned in quite a lot in the last decade and im sure the CPC feels it has room to throw some carrots like this to domestic and foreign investors and markets. This is a volatile transitionary period in China’s economy with all the deleveraging and restructuring going on so i imagine they want some easy numberinos to go up and show, even if its fake financial stuff, and the financial class to shut up a for a bit


  • Hexbear doing the clickbait anti-china thing where a random proffesor/media person/low level official says something means “China says”, weird

    Either way expecting the retirement age to never change from an age set when the average life expectency was 50 years is naive. Cuba has higher RE, some eastern bloc countries had higher than China before the change, some the same ,some lower.

    Uniquely tho China does need to bridge its current level of development and economy to a highly automated and cleanly electrified one in 30-40 years that can sustain and provide without the same anormous enormous human capital demands as today and for that to happen, since indeed their labor force is slowly shrinking and aging and there is a missmatch of labor demand and supply in certain sectors, a gradual 3-4 year retirement age raise from a low base seens like a huge help.

    Idk what the “socialist” idea is? Magicaly make automation increase by an order of magnitude in a decade or import one hundred million workers from the global south







  • First of all China’s average Monthly Money supply has more trippled in the last decade. I agree it must pick up but its by no means sluggish.

    The real issue rn is the sluggish credit cycle. Who is generating the debt that drives the exponential increase in money circulation that you want now that you (China) are killing land finance. What is the asset base backstopping financial activity that goes hand in hand with that money generation now that land is not the fulcrum? Helicopter money drops still require central bank operations to issue a ledger, aka debt. No market economy has a choice on this matter. You either generate collateralized asset to drive money circulation or you don’t have a market economy. China right now is a market economy through and through. The USSR in the 30s and 40s ? Orders of magnitude less so. A weakness to that comparison to keep in mind

    So, one should think of land sales in the Chinese economy the same way one thinks of Treasury Bills in the US economy. T Bills are the US’s unique magic sauce. That’s what the US economy discovered when FDR made war bonds go BRR. Capital formation is whatever collateral you can issue as a promise for future repayment. It doesn’t need to be land. China is trying to shift the basis of capital formation from land sales to more abstract financial instruments but it cant happen overnight. What is needed is a new ,mature, credit generation mechanism that fits China’s current state of development,administrative capacity and local finances.

    Details MUST be very ironed out before attempting such expansions. Sure China is attempting to develop their bond market for example and is slowly itching twoards tax reforms but its not nearly there to support what you are advocating. Comparing it with a mid 30s NON capitalist, non market, massively planned and non globalized /financialized to the slightest USSR economy (with completely different resources and demographics as well as regional disparities and levels of development) doesnt help. Until local finances are sufficiently unlinked from land sales and the bond markets and tax system are sufficiently mature and reformed what you are saying cant happen. Restructuring must come first before any large monetary expansion but also happen slow and controled enough to not cause a bigger crisis. A delicate balance but one that China is walking at the momment quite efficiently

    Many chinese economies advocate (more conservatively) for the direction you describe ,even before and during this plenum. The holdup is in the details of what the specific circulation and dept generation mechanisms will be and how they should work, how to steer them to the right kinds of activities and behaviors, use of credit, resources mobilised, the system’s turnover velocity etc


  • A Chinese EV sold in the EU has a profit margin of 10 TIMES the same EV model sold domestically in China

    I imagine you are refering to this cause this is the only “10 time profit margin” thing i have come across

    Im gonna link this long breakdown of someone that seems to know way more than i (or you i assume) that argues that this figure from this particular research research that, while interesting, understates the amount of variable profit per incremental vehicle sold in China by a notable margin(25%, not 6%). That Incremental onshore profit for each BYD Seal would be €5,395, not €1,306 and also that it overstates the profit margin per unit in Europe by ignoring some additional costs .

    Here https://x.com/GlennLuk/status/1809563664615198784

    Overall this would mean that European markets , while important, arent nearly a “lifeline” for Chinese EVs and that the vast majority of profit is and will be made in domestic sales and in sales in SEA and 10-20k GDP per capita countries. European automakers are dependent from the Chinese market way way more than Chinese EV makers ever will from the EU market. Let alone the US that isnt a relevant market in the first place.